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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a married couple, Sarah and David, that were
madly in love with a life full of promise ahead of them. David,
a general practice physician, was giddy at the thought of being
a father. Sarah, for her part, picked up baby fever shortly after
their marriage in 2017. The couple waited a year for David to
finish his residency, and soon they were trying for a baby.
At first, Sarah simply went off birth control. When
pregnancy did not occur, they started timing Sarah’s cycles. A
few months later they went to a fertilization specialist for tests
and guidance, there they received bad news. Sarah’s ovaries
had a deformity making pregnancy impossible. The couple was
devastated and grieved at their lost hope but resolved to raise a
child regardless.
Sarah, being raised Southern Baptist, approached a
Christian based adoption agency out of Nashville to engage
their services. She arranged a meeting time when she and David
were available to discuss their options. At the appointed hour,
the couple walked into the front parlor and were directed to
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have a seat in their waiting area while they filled out
preliminary paperwork. Once completed, they were called back
into a small conference room.
A lady entered with a somber look on her face. Curious,
David and Sarah greeted her and proclaimed their excitement
on becoming parents. At that, the lady turned to David and
stated bluntly, “We don’t do mixed-race adoptions, because of
our Christian belief.” Stunned, Sarah stated that she too was a
Christian and asked, “What in the Bible led you to such a
conclusion?” The lady responded, “I don’t want to argue my
faith, we just don’t participate.” Unfortunately for the couple,
David was Jewish.1
This situation can befall any loving couple looking to
adopt in Tennessee, thanks to the child placement law codified
in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-147.2 While a typical child
placement law focuses on the wellbeing of the child,3 this law
enables a private child-placing agency to refuse to place a child
with a stable and loving family if the placement violates “the
agency’s written religious or moral convictions or policies.”4
Religion and government both dominate our lives,
regardless of our beliefs or political affiliations. Government is
constantly present. From regulating businesses, building
infrastructure, managing crises, educating citizens, and even
controlling our bodies, government has a hand in nearly
everything. At the same time, religion has an influence on many
of these same areas, creating unavoidable conflicts. Religious
organizations run hospitals, charities, schools, labor unions,
sports organizations, and political associations just to name a
few.
Further complicating matters, religious views are
expressed on our money, in our pledge of allegiance, during
invocations of Congress, and even on the Supreme Court

The couple’s conversation with the adoption agency was derived
from a New York Time’s article. Karen Zraick, Mississippi Event Hall
Refuses to Host Interracial Wedding, Then Apologizes, The New York
Times (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/us/mississippi-interracialcouple-wedding.html.
2 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147 (2020).
3 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101 (2020).
4 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147 (2020).
1
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Building.5 Contrasting these expressions, the United States
Constitution neither mentions nor references God. Instead, the
Constitution’s purpose as laid out in the Preamble is wholly
secular, “to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty.”6
What are we to make of this conundrum? The late
theologian Dr. David Dungan once stated that “there is a
difference between ‘God and Country, and Church and State.’”7
Invoking a higher power to benefit a country is akin to the
Declaration of Independence invoking “Laws of Nature and
Nature’s God” and appealing to “the Supreme Judge of the
world.”8 The Declaration of Independence is not law, however,
but rather a call of protest stating in broad and neutral terms
that people’s rights are divine and unalienable.9
The Constitution tells us the other side of the story, that
our Government is a human endeavor and secular in nature.
Indeed, it was Thomas Jefferson who later wrote that it was the
“the legitimate power of government [to] reach actions only,
and not opinions,” and that the Establishment Clause would
“build[] a wall of separation between Church and State.”10
Thus, if there is a clear demarcation between church and
state; it is that government exists to regulate actions relating to
justice, tranquility, defense, welfare, and liberty, but not to an
individual’s freedom of conscience. Applied to today’s
government, regulations which primarily touch upon the
Moses, along with other lawgivers, is engraved above the Supreme
Court Building’s entrance. Building Features, The Supreme Court of
the United States,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/buildingfeatures.aspx (last
visited April 20, 2020).
6 U.S. Const. pmbl.
7 Audiotape: Dr. David Laird Dungan, Formation of the New
Testament, held by First Presbyterian Church in Knoxville,
Tennessee (June 2005) (on file with author).
8 Thomas Jefferson, the Declaration of Independence paras. 1 and 5
(U.S. 1776).
9
America’s Founding Documents, National Archives,
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration (last visited Nov. 18,
2020).
10 Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists Para. 2
(U.S. 1802).
5
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secular welfare of the population ought to be considered
primarily on a secular basis. When religious organizations take
on secular activities, such as running a hospital or an adoption
agency, government regulation should be neutral towards that
religion’s beliefs while regulating the organization’s actions as
it would a secular organization.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147 violates the Establishment
Clause of both the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions. This child
placement law allows private adoption agencies to discriminate
against families under the guise of religion at the expense of
foster children in need of a stable home. Lemon v. Kurzman
created the appropriate test to determine the constitutionality
of this law because it regulates a secular activity in which
religious organizations participate.
Under Lemon, the law has no secular purpose, it has the
effect of advancing religion, and it fosters excessive
entanglement between government and religion. As such,
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147 should be struck down. This
comment will show that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147 does not
comport with Lemon and is unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and Art. 1 § 3 of
Tennessee’s Constitution. Part II delves into the Court’s
inconsistent application of the Lemon test, examining which
categories of Establishment Clause cases are best answered by
Lemon. Part III explores Tennessee Establishment Clause
precedent, including its faithful adherence to Lemon. Part IV
examines Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147 along with its legislative
history. Part V argues that Lemon is the appropriate lens to
analyze Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147. It then applies Lemon and
proposes that the child-placement law be struck down. Part VI
briefly concludes the examination into the law’s
unconstitutionality.

II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE UNDER LEMON
“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . .”11
The Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment
Clause to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in

11

U.S. Const. amend. I.
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1947.12 The case, Everson v. Board of Education, highlighted the
establishment clause’s intention to raise “a wall of separation
between church and State.”13 It did little, however, to create a
legal framework for Establishment Clause cases to be analyzed.
In 1971, a legal framework finally emerged in the case of
Lemon v. Kurtzman.14 There, a unanimous Supreme Court
created a three-part test to determine the constitutionality of
legislative acts concerning the Establishment Clause.15 “First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, it’s
principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion.”16 These
elements were chosen with care and based on prior Court
precedent.17
The first prong of the test, whether the statute has a
secular legislative purpose, focuses on the rationale underlying
the state action or statute.18 The prong requires a statute to have
a “secular legislative purpose.”19 This does not imply that there
can be no religious purpose if an authentic secular purpose also
exists.20 Importantly, the secular purpose must be genuine and
not merely a “sham.”21 If the sole purpose of the state action is
religious, the act is unconstitutional under Lemon, requiring no
further inquiry into the second or third prongs.22
The second prong is known as the effect prong.23
Assuming a statute or act has a genuine secular purpose, the
next step is to look at the “principal or primary effect” to see if

Everson v. Bd. Of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id. at 16.
14 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
15 Id. at 612-13.
16 Id.
17 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Walz v. Tax
Com. Of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
18 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422 (1961) (‘[T]he
“Establishment” Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of
conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.’).
21 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1987).
22 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
23 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
12
13
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the act “advances [or] inhibits religion.”24 The effect of the
governmental action should not, at a minimum, give preference
to one religion over another, including non-religion.25
Government action should not have the effect of advancing or
condemning a specific religion or religion generally.26 Thus,
despite having a secular purpose, the effect of a statute or act
may render it invalid under the Establishment Clause.
The third prong asks whether a statute or act promotes
excessive government entanglement with religion.27 The
entanglement prong considers “the character and purposes of
the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the
State provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority.”28 The idea is to avoid
placing the state in a position where it is regulating religion so
that any state action can be considered neutral with respect to
religion.29
Despite the apparent consensus, fissures in applying
Lemon emerged after its implementation.30 The Supreme Court
still purports to recognize and implement the Lemon test, but its
application has been erratic and inconsistent. In certain cases,
the Court has disregarded one or more of its elements.31 In
others, the Court has re-interpreted the elements;32 and in

Id.
See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 53 (“[T]he individual freedom of conscience
protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any
religious faith or none at all.”).
26 Id. at 54 (“[T]he political interest in forestalling intolerance extends
beyond intolerance among Christian sects – or even intolerance
among “religions” – to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever and
the uncertain.”).
27 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
28 Id. at 615.
29 See Id.
30 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 801-02 (1983)
(acknowledging the Lemon test but relying on historical significance
instead).
31 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620-21 (1989) (The
“purpose” and “entanglement” prongs of Lemon were not
considered by the Court).
32 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 206 (1997) (“It is simplest to
recognize why entanglement is significant and treat it . . . as an
aspect of the inquiry into a statute’s effect.)
24
25
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others still, the Court has declined to use the Lemon test
altogether.33
Justice’s Scalia and Thomas have argued doing away
with the Lemon test altogether.34 Their arguments tend to attack
Lemon for its inadequacy in solving different kinds of
Establishment Clause cases, particularly those with regards to
historic symbols, monuments, and practices. Better tests may be
available for these types of cases, but for the cases Lemon is
designed to answer, the Court has yet to conceive of a better
test. This resulting trend of the fact-specific approach to
Establishment Clause analysis in the United States, a bedrock
protection under our Constitution, is to surrender guidance and
consistency to a judge’s whim.
Recently in Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Assoc., the Court
noted that Lemon “attempted to find a grand unified theory of
the Establishment Clause.”35 The Court did this to “bring order
and predictability to Establishment Clause decision making.”36
Unfortunately, the “grand unified theory” has been discarded
by the Court in favor of fact-specific determinations that rely on
differing factors depending on what kind of Establishment
Clause case is at hand.37
According to Justice Kavanaugh, there are five separate
categories of Establishment Clause cases: “(1) religious symbols
on government property and religious speech at government
events; (2) religious accommodations and exemptions from
generally applicable laws; (3) government benefits and tax
exemptions for religious organizations; (4) religious expression
in public schools; and (5) regulation of private religious speech
in public forums.”38 Justice Kavanaugh goes on to explain that
"the Lemon test does not explain the Court’s decisions in any of
those five categories.”39

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S.
Ct. 1719 (2018) (ignoring Lemon entirely).
34 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
398 (1993) (Justice Scalia’s concurrence compares Lemon to “some
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave
and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried.”).
35 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n., 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2071 (2019).
36 Id. at 2080.
37 Id. at 2092 (Justice Kavanaugh concurring).
38 Id.
39 Id.
33
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While the Court has segmented categories of
Establishment Clause cases differently,40 there is at least one
category in which the Lemon test is appropriate: Government
acts that regulate secular activities in which religious
institutions take part.
In 1968, Pennsylvania enacted a statute providing
financial support to nonpublic schools for the purpose of
reimbursing textbooks, teacher salaries, and instructional
materials on specific secular subjects.41 Most of these schools
were church based.42 Although the statute had a primary
purpose of ensuring the quality of secular education in all
schools, the programs fostered excessive government
entanglement with religion.43 This was due to the degree of
state supervision and surveillance necessary to ensure
compliance with the statutory requirements separating secular
and religious education.44
The act prospectively regulated a secular activity,
education. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the nonpublic schools under the regulation were Roman Catholic, at
around 95%.45 Finally, because Lemon failed the excessive
entanglement prong of its test, the Pennsylvania statute was
held unconstitutional.46
By contrast, historic symbols and monuments are not
functions at all. Although many are secular in nature, such as
an obelisk or war memorial, many others are not.47 Further
complicating matters, historic landmarks often have evolving
and multiple meanings over time.48 Applying Lemon simply
makes little sense in these arenas, because the questions asked
by Lemon are inconsistent with the nature of those kinds of
Establishment Clause cases.

Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583 n.4 (“[A] historical approach is not useful
in determining the proper roles of church and state in public schools,
since free public education was virtually nonexistent at the time the
Constitution was adopted.”)
41 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.
42 Id. at 608.
43 Id. at 614.
44 Id. at 620-21.
45 Id. at 608.
46 Id. at 615.
47 Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2082.
48 Id. at 2084.
40
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For instance, what is the primary secular purpose of
maintaining a hundred-year-old Latin cross originally created
by a private entity to honor WWI Veterans?49 Every bystander
will have a different takeaway based on their preferences and
biases, rendering the question unanswerable. Does installing a
statue of the Ten Commandments near a government building
have the effect of advancing a specific religion over others?50
Does it have the effect of advancing religion generally over nonreligion? While many have said yes, many others point to
Abraham’s tablets as a moral foundational to law and order.51
How about allowing prayer before a session of
legislature?52 One might expect that to foster excessive
entanglement between government and religion; but opening a
legislative session with a prayer of invocation is a longstanding
practice that pre-dates the First Amendment altogether.53 The
Lemon test is ill equipped to answer these difficult questions due
to their subjective meanings and historical weight.
Lemon is inherently forward looking, as in its first
application to Pennsylvania’s classroom law. There in its proper
use, the state was regulating religious organizations that took
on a secular activity.54 Although Lemon does not always lead to
consistent results when applied to historic symbols,
monuments, or longstanding practices, it is the only
unanimously approved Supreme Court test in an Establishment
Clause case.55 As in the original Pennsylvania case, applying
Lemon is the best possible solution when dealing with a
government act that regulates secular activities in which
religious institutions partake.

Id. at 2082 (the Court analyzing the purpose of a thirty-two-foot
tall Latin cross).
50 Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), with McCreary
Cnty. V. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
51 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. at 691-92 (“The inclusion of the Ten
Commandments monument in this group has a dual significance,
partaking of both religion and government.”).
52 Marsh, 463 U.S. 783 (the Court held Nebraska’s practice of opening
legislative sessions with a prayer constitutional).
53 Id. at 795.
54 Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
55 Id.
49
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III. ARTICLE 1 § 3 OF TENNESSEE’S CONSTITUTION UNDER
LEMON
“That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
conscience; that no man can of right be compelled to attend,
erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any
minister against his consent; that no human authority can, in
any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of
conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given, by law,
to any religious establishment or mode of worship.”56
The time has come for Tennessee’s Supreme Court to
once again clarify the state’s Establishment Clause doctrine,
and the best route is through the Lemon test. Tennessee’s
Establishment Clause doctrine has evolved alongside the
Federal Courts, but unlike the Federal Courts, Tennessee has
held steadfast to Lemon. Where Tennessee Courts have chosen
not to rely on Lemon, they have assented to the Establishment
Clause’s essential tenet.57
“Tenn. Const. art. I, § 3 and the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution arise from the same constitutional
milieu.”58 This is not to say the two amendments are identical,
but that they are born out of the same idea “foreclos[ing] the
establishment of a state or national religion similar to other
eighteenth century systems.”59 As early as 1956, Tennessee’s
Supreme Court held that while the two amendments “are
practically synonymous,” Tennessee’s provisions are “broader
and more comprehensive.”60

A. SERPENTS, BOOZE, AND A SATAN-FREE CURRICULUM
In a 1975 case, Tennessee’s Supreme Court had to
consider whether drinking strychnine poison and handling

Tenn. Const. art 1, § 3.
See State v. Crank, 468 S.W.3d 15, 30 n.8 (2015) (quoting James
Madison saying “[t]o give exemption to some denominations and
not to all offends the equality with which all men enter society.”).
58 Martin v. Beer Bd., 908 S.W.2d 941, 949 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
59 Id.
60 Carden v. Bland, 288 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tenn. 1956).
56
57
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snakes were legitimate parts of a church’s religious service.61
The Lemon test was not implemented because the question was
not predicated on a previous state action but revolved around
whether the state may enjoin a religious group from handling
snakes during worship under a public nuisance theory.62 Still,
the court took pains to point out that while the “right to believe
is absolute; the right to act is subject to reasonable regulation
designed to protect a compelling state interest.”63
In holding that a permanent injunction was in order, the
Court stated that art. 1, § 3 of Tennessee’s Constitution is
“substantially stronger” than the provisions of the First
Amendment.64 The Court then stated that regardless, “a
religious practice may be limited, curtailed or restrained to the
point of outright prohibition, where it involves a clear and
present danger to the interests of society.”65
In a separate case that year, Tennessee declared its
adherence to the Lemon test.66 Similar to the Pennsylvania
statute in Lemon, the case involved a state education statute. The
Tennessee statute prohibited teaching creationism in public
school textbooks unless it was taught as opinion rather than
scientific fact.67 In stating that the Act was “unconstitutional on
its face,” the Court agreed with a Sixth Circuit opinion that it
failed under Lemon.68
The Act failed the effect prong of the Lemon test because
it favored “the Bible of the Jews,” demonstrating “another
method of preferential treatment of particular faiths by state
law.”69 Further, “the statute would inextricably involve the
State Textbook Commission in . . . Chief Justice Burger’s third
standard” set out in Lemon.70 The opinion continued, “[i]t would
be utterly impossible for the Textbook Commission to
determine which religious theories were ‘occult’ or ‘satanical’
without seeking to resolve the theologians through the ages.”71
State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975).
Id. at 102.
63 Id. at 107.
64 Id. at 111.
65 Id.
66 Steele v. Waters, 527 S.W.2d 72 (Tenn. 1975).
67 Id. at 73.
68 Id. at 73-74.
69 Id. at 73.
70 Id.
71 Id.
61
62
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Thus, the Act fostered an excessive entanglement between
government and church.72
In Martin v. Beer, Tennessee’s Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of banning the sale of beer on
Sundays.73 The Court emphasized the secular importance of
regulating the sale of beer as it is considered “dangerous to the
community.”74 Justice Koch’s opinion continues with a lengthy
analysis over the Constitutional prohibition against religious
preferences, affirming Lemon in the process.75
The opinion first acknowledges that the “separation
between church and state is blurred and indistinct and varies
with the circumstances.”76 Nevertheless, the opinion then
emphatically adheres to the Lemon test, stating that “in order to
prevent the wall of separation between church and state from
becoming as winding as the serpentine wall Thomas Jefferson
designed for the University of Virginia, the Court has found it
useful to examine the statute from three vantage points.”77
The three vantage points referenced above are the three
prongs of Lemon: a statute’s secular purpose, it’s principle or
primary effect, and whether it fosters excessive governmental
entanglement with religion.78 The opinion then adopts a fourth
prong suggested by Justice O’Connor known as the
“endorsement analysis” prong.79 It asks, “whether a reasonable
observer would view such longstanding practices as a
disapproval of his or her particular religious choices, in light of
the fact that they serve a secular purpose rather than a sectarian
one and have largely lost their religious significance over
time.”80
In applying this modified Lemon test, the opinion states
that although statutes regulating the sale of beer were originally
religiously motivated, as early as 1852 courts began recognizing
Sunday closing laws as having a secular purpose.81 Prohibiting
the sale of beer on Sunday neither advances nor inhibits
Id.
Martin, 908 S.W.2d 941.
74 Id. at 945.
75 Id. at 950-51.
76 Id. at 950.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 950-51.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 952.
72
73
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religion.82 Further, it does not foster excessive governmental
entanglement with religion.83 Finally, in applying Justice
O’Connor’s fourth prong, “a reasonable observer would not
equate the adoption of such an ordinance as governmental
approval or disapproval of his or her particular religious
beliefs.”84
As recently as 2013, Tennessee courts have continued
applying Lemon in Establishment Clause cases.85 In Christ
Church Pentecostal, the question was whether a bookstore/café
area contained in a church family life center should qualify for
a tax exemption.86 The Court of Appeals relied on Lemon to hold
that the bookstore was “nothing short of a retail establishment
housed within the walls of the center, complete with paid staff,
inventory control, retail pricing, and a wide array of
merchandise for sale to the general public.”87
The court held that the taxation statutes have a clear
secular purpose, they should be applied “equitably is a
constitutional mandate.”88 In opposition, the Plaintiff’s position
was that taxing the bookstore “impermissibly entangles the
State in matter of church doctrine by defining a ‘religious
use.’”89 The court held to the contrary, stating the “imposition
of property tax on church property that is . . . essentially
commercial in nature does not interfere with [Christ Church
Pentecostal’s] doctrine, beliefs, faith, or government.”90 Thus,
under the Lemon test, taxing a church’s retail bookstore and café
as a secular business does not violate the Establishment Clause,
despite accepting the church’s “assertion that providing ‘third
spaces’ is part of its outreach ministry.”91
Although slighted and battered in Federal courts,
Tennessee courts embrace Lemon as the most faithful execution
of Establishment Clause doctrine. While at times this has
Id. at 954.
Id. at 954-55 (though not explicitly stated, the court held that the
law does not violate Tenn. Const. art. I, § 3).
84 Id. at 954.
85 Christ Church Pentecostal v. Tenn. State bd. Of Equalization, 428
S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).
86 Id. at 804.
87 Id. at 813.
88 Id. at 815.
89 Id. at 814.
90 Id. at 818.
91 Id. at 818-19.
82
83
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included Justice O’Connor’s fourth “endorsement analysis”
prong, it is only helpful in circumstances that include
“longstanding practices.”92 When those circumstances are not
present, Tennessee should continue relying on Lemon as the
proper lens in analyzing Establishment Clause cases involving
a government regulation over primarily secular activities in
which religious institutions participate.

IV. TENNESSEE’S ADOPTION STATUTE AND ITS LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
In January of 2020, Tennessee’s Governor Bill Lee signed
into law Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147, which now regulates the
relationship between state government and privately-operated
child-placing agencies in Tennessee.93 The bill states that “no
private licensed child-placing agency shall be required to . . .
participate in any placement of a child for foster care or
adoption when the proposed placement would violate the
agency’s written religious or moral convictions or policies.”94
The bill allows child-placing agencies in Tennessee to
discriminate against anyone when deciding whether or not to
allow a child’s adoption to proceed, so long as the
discrimination is articulated in the agency’s “written religious
or moral convictions or policies” to “the extent allowed by
federal law.”95
The child placement bill further protects private
adoption agencies by preventing the department of children’s
services from denying licensure due to their “objection to . . .
participating in a placement that violates the agency’s written
religious or moral convictions or policies.”96 It continues by
stating that “a state or local government entity shall not deny to
a private licensed child-placing agency any [financial
assistance] because of the agency’s objection to . . . participating
in a placement that violates the agency’s written religious or
moral convictions or policies.”97 Finally, the bill states that an
agency’s refusal to participate in “a placement that violates the
Martin, 908 S.W.2d at 951.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
92
93

AS WINDING AS THE SERPENTINE WALL

413

agency’s written religious or moral convictions or policies shall
not form the basis of a civil action for either damages or
injunctive relief.”98
To restate, this bill allows a private child-placing agency
to discriminate based on “written religious or moral convictions
or policies.”99 It then prevents the department of children’s
services from denying licensure, the state and local
governments from withholding financial support, and any civil
litigation in Tennessee based on an agency’s “written religious
or moral convictions or policies.”100
As with many religious bills introduced in recent
history, this child placement bill was written and advanced by
the Congressional Prayer Caucus Foundation, a non-profit
religious political organization.101 The foundation’s vision
includes preserving Judeo-Christian heritage and promoting
prayer.102 Initiatives for carrying out this vision include the
foundation’s American Prayer Caucus Network to “promote
prayer and use the legislative process to preserve our nation’s
Judeo-Christian heritage,” and In God We Trust, Put It Up! to
encourage the display of In God We Trust in schools and
government buildings.103
Another of the foundation’s initiatives is known as
Project Blitz, which proposes religiously motivated Christian
heritage bills.104 In 2018 alone, Project Blitz proposed over 200
Christian heritage bills in over 32 states and Congress. To date,
over 60 such bills have been signed into law.105
Id.
Id.
100 Id.
101 Congressional Prayer Caucus Foundation,
https://cpcfoundation.com (last visited April 20, 2020).
102 Congressional Prayer Caucus Foundation, Vision,
https://cpcfoundation.com/about/mission/ (last visited April 20,
2020).
103 Congressional Prayer Caucus Foundation, Faith Impact
Opportunities, https://cpcfoundation.com/initiatives/ (last visited
April 20, 2020).
104 Congressional Prayer Caucus Foundation, Project Blitz,
https://cpcfoundation.com/first-freedom-coalition-project-blitz/
(last visited April 20, 2020).
105 The Center for Public Integrity, Adoption Centers: The Latest
Battleground for Religious Freedom,
https://publicintegrity.org/politics/state-politics/copy-paste98
99
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One of the project’s overarching priorities includes
pushing for public policies in favor of biblical values
concerning marriage and sexuality.106 This category includes
legislation allowing state occupational license holders, such as
barbers, lawyers, health care providers, and adoption agencies
to discriminate on the basis of their sincerely held religious
beliefs.107
In 2020, Tennessee became the latest state to utilize the
foundation’s language when it passed its child placement bill.108
Rep. Tim Rudd from Murfreesboro sponsored the bill in the
House. He said the child placement bill did not originate with
Project Blitz, but rather was based on Virginia’s law.109 Rudd
continued that it was given to him by John Bumpus, a trustee
on the board for Tennessee Baptist Children’s Homes, a private
child-placing agency that vets prospective parents based on
religion.110 Despite Rudd’s assertion as to the bill’s origin,
Virginia’s religious adoption bill was written by the
Congressional Prayer Caucus Foundation as part of Project
Blitz.111
In the House Children & Families Subcommittee, Rep.
Rudd first introduced the child placement bill for
consideration.112 He said the bill’s purpose was to protect faithbased child-placing agencies from frivolous lawsuits so they
may continue operating as they currently do.113 There was
legislate/adoption-centers-the-latest-battleground-for-religiousfreedom/?fbclid=IwAR2r2cG9oz-sQvwZJFfJPJNLc-De9gXP2BLO8DFIBgb7ZAN59p3x-JS9_c (last visited April 20, 2020).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147.
109 The Center for Public Integrity, Adoption Centers: The Latest
Battleground for Religious Freedom,
https://publicintegrity.org/politics/state-politics/copy-pastelegislate/adoption-centers-the-latest-battleground-for-religiousfreedom/?fbclid=IwAR2r2cG9oz-sQvwZJFfJPJNLc-De9gXP2BLO8DFIBgb7ZAN59p3x-JS9_c (last visited April 20, 2020).
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 The Child-Placement Law, Hearing on H.B. 0836 Before the
Children and Families Subcommittee, 2019 Leg., 111th General
Assembly (Tenn. 2019),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=414&clip_id=
16680 (last visited April 20, 2020).
113 Id.
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immediate pushback from attorney Stacey Odneal, a Tennessee
specialist in child law, who pointed out that there were nearly
8,000 foster children in Tennessee, half of which do not
currently live in stable households.114 After concluding, the bill
was voted out of the committee.115
The bill then went to the Judiciary Committee. There,
Rep. Karen Camper spoke next. She asked if a faith-based
adoption agency can deny an atheist the ability to adopt.116 Rep.
Rudd responded that it would only occur if the agency had a
written statement to that effect.117 She followed up by asking if
there was a level of proof required for a faith-based adoption
agency to prove that an individual does not conform to their
beliefs.118 Rep. Rudd admitted that the bill does not address that
question, but simply gives rights to faith-based agencies.119
Once on the House floor, Rep. Bo Mitchell spoke up. He
said he was concerned that if he had a Jewish family in his
district, they would be unable to adopt from an agency with
moral convictions when there are so many kids in need of a
good home.120 Rep. Rudd responded that he could not predict
what a religious agency would do because it wasn’t in his bill.121
Rep. John Ray Clemmons then asked to what extent federal law
allowed adoption agencies to discriminate based on their
religious beliefs.122 Rep. Rudd stated that he could not talk
about things outside the bill.123
Between March of 2019 and January of 2020, the childplacement bill sat in limbo before finally being presented in the
Id. (statement by Stacey Odneal Esq.).
Id.
116 The Child-Placement Law, Hearing on H.B. 0836 Before the
Judiciary Committee, 2019 Leg., 111th General Assembly (Tenn.
2019),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=414&clip_id=
16847 (statement by Rep. Karen Camper) (last visited April 20, 2020).
117 Id. (statement by Rep. Tim Rudd).
118 Id. (statement by Rep. Karen Camper).
119 Id. (statement by Rep. Tim Rudd).
120 The Child-Placement Law, Hearing on H.B. 0836 Before the House
Floor Session, 2019 Leg., 111th General Assembly (Tenn. 2019),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=414&clip_id=
17025 (statement by Rep. Bo Mitchell) (last visited April 20, 2020).
121 Id. (statement by Rep. Tim Rudd).
122 Id. (question by Rep. John Ray Clemmons).
123 Id. (response by Rep. Tim Rudd).
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Senate. There, bill sponsor Sen. Paul Rose began debating Sen.
Jeff Yarbro about the merits of a proposed amendment.124 Sen.
Yarbro wanted to remove the provision extending the
legislation to government contracts, grants, and programs.125
His concern was for the separation of church and state,
suggesting that the bill only apply to private religious
institutions that do not rely on public tax-payer dollars.126
Sen. Rose was not amused by the proposal, stating that
the amendment “is insidious and hostile by wiping out the
intent of this bill.”127 Sen. Yarbro asserted that private actors
become public actors when they use public dollars to do a
public function on behalf of the public.128 He argued that there
is no right to enter into a contract with the government and
urged passage of his amendment because we should not allow
the bill to extend to protected taxpayer dollars.129 Sen. Rose
moved to table the amendment, and it was promptly
seconded.130
Sen. Steven Dickerson spoke next, asking “what’s the
intent of this bill?”131 Sen. Rose initially evaded the question by
responding it was to codify existing practices in the State of
Tennessee.132 Sen. Dickerson pushed back and asked Sen. Rose
to cite an example of a family or family structure where an
agency felt compelled to place children against their will.133 Sen.
Rose responded, “this prevents an agency that based on their
stated religious moral convictions do not choose to place a child
with a non-conventional, in my opinion a conventional home,
which is a married mother and father, cannot be forced to do
so.”134 When asked if a Muslim adoption agency could refuse
The Child-Placement Law, Hearing on H.B. 0836 Before the Senate
Session, 2020 Leg., 111th General Assembly (Tenn. 2020),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=414&clip_id=
21093 (last visited April 20, 2020).
125 Id. (amendment proposal by Sen. Jeff Yarbro).
126 Id.
127 Id. (statement by Sen. Paul Rose).
128 Id. (statement by Sen. Jeff Yarbro).
129 Id.
130 Id. (motion by Sen. Paul Rose).
131 Id. (question by Sen. Steven Dickerson).
132 Id. (statement by Sen. Paul Rose).
133 Id. (statement by Sen. Steven Dickerson).
134 Id. (statement by Sen. Paul Rose referencing homosexual couples
at “non-conventional”).
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services to an Episcopalian family or vice-versa, Sen. Rose
responded “I’m not a lawyer, but that’s my understanding.”135
Sen. Dickerson then brought up the humanitarian impact on
those children who could have a forever home but will now
have to wait a longer period of time.136 Dickerson closed by
saying this was bad for public policy.137
Towards the end of the debate, Sen. Mike Bale asked
how many agencies across the state are religious versus secular
based.138 Sen. Rose did not know the answer but guessed the
majority were faith based.139 Finally, Sen. Rose moved for the
bill’s third and final consideration. It passed the Senate 20 ayes
to 6 nays.140

V. TENNESSEE’S ADOPTION STATUTE UNDER LEMON
The Lemon test is the appropriate test to analyze the
constitutionality of Tennessee’s recent child placement law.
Created to determine the constitutionality of legislative acts
concerning the Establishment Clause, there is no better lens
when applied to legislative acts involving government
regulations over a primarily secular activity.
Tennessee’s child placement law falls into this category.
Codified at the end of Tennessee’s chapter on adoption, the act
regulates the relationship between government and private
child placement agencies.141 The threshold question then is
whether a private child-placing agency primarily conducts a
secular activity or function. This is easily answered in the
affirmative.
Tennessee’s adoption statute clearly states that its
primary purpose is to “effectuate to the greatest extent possible
the rights and interests of persons affected by adoption,
especially those of the adopted persons, which are specifically
protected by the constitutions of the United States and the state
of Tennessee.”142 The statute continues by stating that actions
Id. (response by Sen. Paul Rose).
Id. (statement by Sen. Steven Dickerson).
137 Id.
138 Id. (question by Sen. Mike Bale).
139 Id. (response by Sen. Paul Rose).
140 Id.
141 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147.
142 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101.
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should be done “consistent with the best interest of the child,”
recognizing “[t]he rights of children to be raised in loving
homes.”143 The statute’s section concludes, “[i]n all cases, when
the best interests of the child and those of the adults are in
conflict, such conflict shall always be resolved to favor the
rights and the best interests of the child.”144 Clearly, adoption
services constitute a primarily secular state function.
Having determined that Lemon is the appropriate test,
the next question becomes which version should the courts rely
on. Should Justice O’Connor’s fourth line of inquiry be included
in the analysis? The appropriate situations to utilize the
“endorsement analysis” prong involve situations which
include a longstanding practice.145 Here, there is no
longstanding state practice of condoning religiously motivated
adoption policies by private child placing agencies. The
adoption statute’s purpose as stated above indicates as much.146
Therefore, the Lemon test’s original three prongs remain the best
tool to analyze Tennessee’s child placement law.
Starting with the secular purpose prong, the focus is on
the rationale underlying the state action or statute.147 Looking
at the statute, a plain reading indicates that it protects a “private
licensed child-placing agency” from both governmental and
private actions on the basis of “the agency’s written religious or
moral convictions or policies.”148 This runs counter to the stated
constitutional protections “consistent with the best interest of
the child” codified in Tennessee’s adoption statute.149 There is
no secular purpose in protecting a private child-placing agency
based on its religious convictions when the protections come at
the expense of constitutionally protected children’s rights.
In contrast, Christ Church Pentecostal is Tennessee’s best
example of a statute upheld has having a clear secular
purpose.150 The taxation statute’s primary purpose is to raise
revenue for Tennessee.151 By applying the tax to all retail
Id.
Id.
145 Martin, 908 S.W.2d at 951.
146 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101.
147 Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
148 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147.
149 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101.
150 Christ Church Pentecostal v. Tenn. State bd. Of Equalization, 428
S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).
151 Id. at 818.
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establishments, including the church in question, the statute
operates equitably under its constitutional mandate.152 There is
no religious purpose to taxing retail establishments uniformly
regardless of their ownership. The same cannot be said of
Tennessee’s child placement law.
Should the purpose still be in dispute, diving into the
child placement law’s legislative history is instructive. The bill’s
language is derived from a non-profit religious political
organization whose stated vision includes the preservation of
Judeo-Christian heritage.153 Despite Rep. Rudd’s assertion that
he does not know about Project Blitz, he acknowledged
receiving the bill from a trustee on the board for Tennessee
Baptist Children’s Homes.154 Regardless, Tennessee’s childplacement law was written and advanced by religious
organizations.
More telling still, Rep. Rudd clearly stated on the House
subcommittee that the purpose of his sponsored bill was to
protect religiously affiliated adoption agencies.155 In the Senate,
bill sponsor Sen. Paul Rose initially stated the bill’s intent was
to codify existing practices in the state of Tennessee.156 After
being nudged for further insight he continued, “this prevents
an agency that based on their stated religious moral convictions
do not choose to place a child with a non-conventional, in my

Id. at 815.
Congressional Prayer Caucus Foundation, Vision,
https://cpcfoundation.com/about/mission/ (last visited April 20,
2020).
154 The Center for Public Integrity, Adoption Centers: The Latest
Battleground for Religious Freedom,
https://publicintegrity.org/politics/state-politics/copy-pastelegislate/adoption-centers-the-latest-battleground-for-religiousfreedom/?fbclid=IwAR2r2cG9oz-sQvwZJFfJPJNLc-De9gXP2BLO8DFIBgb7ZAN59p3x-JS9_c (last visited April 20, 2020).
155 The Child-Placement Law, Hearing on H.B. 0836 Before the
Children and Families Subcommittee, 2019 Leg., 111th General
Assembly (Tenn. 2019),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=414&clip_id=
16680 (last visited April 20, 2020).
156 The Child-Placement Law, Hearing on H.B. 0836 Before the Senate
Session, 2020 Leg., 111th General Assembly (Tenn. 2020),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=414&clip_id=
21093 (last visited April 20, 2020).
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opinion a conventional home, which is a married mother and
father, cannot be forced to do so.”157
As a plain reading of the child-placement law and its
legislative history suggests, the purpose to this bill is to protect
religious child-placing agencies. Specifically, it is to protect
them from actions adverse to the Tennessee adoption statute’s
secular purpose to act in ways “consistent with the child’s best
interests.”158 Thus, the bill’s purpose is religiously motivated
and has no secular purpose. Since the sole purpose of the act is
religious, it is unconstitutional under Lemon and requires no
further inquiry.159
For the sake of a thorough analysis, however, the next
prong to be utilized is the effect prong. Asking whether the
child-placement law has the “principal or primary effect” of
“advanc[ing or] inhibit[ing] religion,” leads to two difficult
questions.160 The first question is whether an act advances or
condemns a specific religion.161 If this prong is to be interpreted
so narrowly, then the child-placement law might pass this
prong of the test.
Turning again to legislative history, Sen. Rose was
asked if a Muslim adoption agency could refuse services to an
Episcopalian family or vice versa.162 In response he stated that
was his understanding.163 Thus, the legislative history suggests
that the bill does not on its face advance a specific religion over
others. Further, the bill mentions no specific religion, sect, or
denomination, but simply “the agency’s written religious or
moral convictions or policies.”164
However, the second prong’s question does not ask
whether the intent of an act advances a specific religion, but
whether an act has the effect of advancing a specific religion.165
Id. (statement by Sen. Paul Rose referencing homosexual couples
as “non-conventional”).
158 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101.
159 Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56.
160 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
161 Allen, 392 U.S. at 243.
162 The Child-Placement Law, Hearing on H.B. 0836 Before the Senate
Session, 2020 Leg., 111th General Assembly (Tenn. 2020),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=414&clip_id=
21093 (last visited April 20, 2020).
163 Id. (response by Sen. Paul Rose).
164 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147.
165 Allen, 392 U.S. at 243.
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Answering this question is more difficult, but not wholly
unanswerable. When Sen. Bale asked how many private
licensed agencies were religious as opposed to secular, Sen.
Rose admitted he did not know specifically but guessed the
majority were faith based.166 If this is the case, then based on
Tennessee’s demographics the majority of faith-based childplacement agencies are likely Christian.167 While this question
goes beyond the scope of this writing, there is a reasonable
chance that the child placement law has the effect of advancing
a specific religion, and would fail the second prong.
The second question in the second prong asks whether
the act advances or inhibits religion generally against nonreligion.168 Here again, the legislative history is helpful. When
asked by Rep. Karen Camper whether a faith-based adoption
agency can deny an atheist the ability to adopt, Rep. Rudd
responded that it would so long as the agency had a written
statement to that effect.169 Even if faith-based adoption agencies
were in the minority of private adoption agencies statewide, the
child-placement bill has the effect of allowing religiously
affiliated agencies to discriminate but does not allow secular
agencies to do the same. Thus, the bill fails Lemon’s second
prong requirement that a bill’s effect be neutral to religion
generally.
Turning now to Lemon’s third prong, whether a statute
promotes excessive government entanglement with religion,
the answer is again yes. Focusing on the “the resulting
relationship between the government and religious
authority,”170 this bill invites the kind of regulation on religion
The Child-Placement Law, Hearing on H.B. 0836 Before the Senate
Session, 2020 Leg., 111th General Assembly (Tenn. 2020),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=414&clip_id=
21093 (last visited April 20, 2020).
167 81 percent of Tennessee’s adults are Christian, Pew Research
Center, Religious Landscape Study,
https://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscapestudy/state/tennessee/ (last visited April 20, 2020).
168 Allen, 392 U.S. at 243.
169 The Child-Placement Law, Hearing on H.B. 0836 Before the
Judiciary Committee, 2019 Leg., 111th General Assembly (Tenn.
2019),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=414&clip_id=
16847 (last visited April 20, 2020).
170 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
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that the Establishment Clause was meant to prevent. For
instance, Rep. Camper asked what level of proof was required
for a faith-based adoption agency to prove that an individual
does not conform to their beliefs.171 Rep. Rudd declined to
answer, saying that the bill does not address that question, but
simply gives rights to faith-based agencies.172
Rep. Camper’s question was prescient, as it is one
Tennessee courts will be forced to confront. If there is no level
of proof required for a private adoption agency to deny their
services, then it need not limit its discrimination to its “written
religious or moral convictions or policies.”173 If an agency has a
written statement that they do not accept atheists, they have no
requirement to prove that an adoptive family is atheist. A
prospective parent could take a pledge of faith, have their
pastor write a note, or even consent to a baptism and it wouldn’t
amount to sufficient proof to force an agency to abide by its own
written policy.
If there is a level of proof required to demonstrate that
an agency is abiding by its “written religious or moral
convictions or policies,”174 then the courts will be in the
awkward position of dissecting what does and does not count
as a religious moral conviction. This is the very “wall between
church and state” that the Establishment Clause was meant to
uphold.175 The government should not position itself such that
it will be forced to determine what counts as a religious
conviction. Determinations over theology tread on the freedom
of conscience and should only be done when there is a
compelling state interest, such as in Tennessee’s snake handling
case.176
There is no better example of a law which fails the third
prong than in the original Lemon case.177 There, the degree of
The Child-Placement Law, Hearing on H.B. 0836 Before the
Judiciary Committee, 2019 Leg., 111th General Assembly (Tenn.
2019),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=414&clip_id=
16847 (statement by Rep. Karen Camper) (last visited April 20, 2020).
172 Id. (statement by Rep. Tim Rudd).
173 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147.
174 Id.
175 Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists Para.
2 (U.S. 1802).
176 Swann, 527 S.W.2d 99.
177 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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state supervision and surveillance necessary to ensure
compliance with the statutory requirement separating secular
and religious education was found to foster excessive
governmental entanglement.178 It is hard to imagine a more
entangled government than when a court considers doctrinal
theology for the purposes of deciding whether an adoption
agency’s “written religious or moral convictions or policies” are
sincere or applied honestly.
Another intersection that could lead to entanglement
was highlighted when Rep. John Ray Clemmons asked to what
extent federal law allowed adoption agencies to discriminate
based on their religious beliefs.179 Rep. Rudd again stated that
he could not talk about things outside the bill.180 This oversight
by Rep. Rudd signals that it will be the courts’ task to balance
these interests. May a faith-based child placing agency
discriminate on the basis of race or other protected classes?
Would gender be protected as a basis for discrimination by a
religiously motivated adoption agency? These questions are
likely to come up due to this legislation and foster additional
entanglement.
Further entanglement can be gleaned from Sen. Yarbro’s
rejected amendment calling for the bill to only apply to private
religious institutions that do not rely on public tax-payer
dollars.181 Sen. Rose’s outright condemnation of this
amendment acknowledges that under this bill, the government
subsidizes religious institutions with taxpayer money for
performing a secular function while retaining the right to
discriminate based on its religious beliefs.182 Thus, Tennessee’s
child-placement
law
fosters
excessive
government
entanglement by placing the state in a position where it is
regulating religion.
Id. at 620-21.
The Child-Placement Law, Hearing on H.B. 0836 Before the House
Floor Session, 2019 Leg., 111th General Assembly (Tenn. 2019),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=414&clip_id=
17025 (question by Rep. John Ray Clemmons) (last visited April 20,
2020).
180 Id. (response by Rep. Tim Rudd).
181 The Child-Placement Law, Hearing on H.B. 0836 Before the Senate
Session, 2020 Leg., 111th General Assembly (Tenn. 2020),
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=414&clip_id=
21093 (last visited April 20, 2020).
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Tennessee’s recently passed child-placement law is
unconstitutional. Lemon is the appropriate test for an
Establishment Clause case relating to government regulations
over secular activities, and the child-placement law’s regulation
over child placement agencies clearly involves a secular
activity. Applying Lemon shows that the law has no secular
purpose, the primary effect advances religion generally, and it
encourages excessive government entanglement. Thus,
Tennessee’s child-placement law failed all three of Lemon’s
prongs and is unconstitutional.

VI. CONCLUSION
Tennessee’s recently passed child-placement law is
unconstitutional under both the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment and under Article 1 § 3 of Tennessee’s
Constitution. After a careful determination that Lemon is the
appropriate test for this kind of Establishment Clause case, one
where the government regulates a secular activity in which
religious establishments participate, the law failed all three of
Lemon’s prongs. The law has no secular purpose, the primary
effect advances religion generally, and it encourages excessive
governmental entanglement.
Thankfully, Sarah and David are a fictitious couple and
will never know the pain of being turned away due to
circumstances outside of their control. More thankfully still,
there is no child on the other side of their story, waiting for a
loving home. But for thousands of children in Tennessee’s
foster system today, the threat that they will be kept in unstable
situations away from a loving forever home is all too real.183
Tennessee’s child-placement law continues to allow
similar situations to flourish at the expense of a constitutionally
protected class.184 Further, it runs counter to the Tennessee
adoption statute’s promise that, “[i]n all cases, when the best
interests of the child and those of the adults are in conflict, such
Agencies approved by the Department of Children’s Services
served 8,499 children during the 2019 fiscal year; Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services, Annual Report 2019,
https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/dcs/documents/quality_im
provement/annual-reports/AnnualReport_2018-2019.pdf (last
visited April 20, 2020).
184 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101.
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conflict shall always be resolved to favor the rights and the best
interests of the child.”185 For these reasons, Tennessee Code
Ann. § 36-1-147 is unconstitutional.

185

Id.
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